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A BUBERIAN APPROACH TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: SO THAT
WE MAY BE ABLE TO FACE OUR
POORER BRETHREN EYE TO EYE
MARIA L. CIAMPI*

In 1923, Martin Buber, one of the most renowned Jewish philosophers of the twentieth century,' published his classic work, I
and Thou, 2 in which he explored the relationships between person

and person3 and between person and community.4 In this and in
numerous other works, 5 Buber enunciated a philosophy that the
relationships between person and person and between person and
6 Buber
community should be relationships of mutual confirmation.
7
referred to his philosophy as the life of dialogue.
In 1991, we, as a nation, will celebrate the bicentennial of the
ratification of the Bill of Rights.8 The Bill of Rights has transcended its political origins 9 to become the foundation and protec* Assistant Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A. 1981, Fordham University; J.D. 1986, St. John's University School of Law. Special thanks to Robert Home, one
of my former students, for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this Essay.
I B. MARTIN, GREAT TWENTIETH CENTURY JEWISH PHILOSOPHERS 238 (1970).
2 M. BUBER, I AND THOU (R.D. Smith trans. 2d ed. 1958) [hereinafter I AND THOU].
3 See infra notes 26-75 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
" For a bibliography of the writings of Martin Buber, see M. COHN & R. BUBER, MARTIN
BUBER: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HIS WRITINGS 1897-1978 (1980); W. MOONAN, MARTIN BUBER AND
HIS CRITICS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HIS WRITINGS IN ENGLISH THROUGH 1978
(1981).
e See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
See generally M. BUBER, Dialogue, in BETWEEN MAN AND MAN (R.G. Smith trans.
1965) [hereinafter Dialogue] (detailed discussion of Buber's philosophy of dialogue).
8 The Bill of Rights was ratified on December 15, 1791. L. LEvY, The Bill of Rights, in
THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 195 (1988) [hereinafter The Bill of Rights].
0 The United States Constitution, as ratified in 1787, did not contain a Bill of Rights.
See L. LEvY, CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: ASPECTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 105 (1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS]. The omission of a Bill of Rights from the Constitution
turned out to be the "most important obstacle in the way of its adoption by the states." Id.
The Anti-federalists attempted to use the omission of a Bill of Rights as a powerful weapon
in their fight to defeat the ratification of the Constitution, The Bill of Rights, supra note 8,
at 197, or as a reason to call a second convention which would in effect prevent ratification,
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tor of human rights and freedoms.' 0 The Bill of Rights has become,
in essence, a document of confirmation: a document that has confirmed the existence of the individual by protecting basic human
rights and needs."
I suggest in this Essay that constitutional analysis, particularly in the area of individual rights where technical doctrine often
overshadows individual rights and freedoms, must instead incorporate the philosophy of dialogue. The extent to which the philosophy of dialogue should influence the decision in a particular case
can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.
id. at 312. Massachusetts, by a close vote, secured ratification by recommending a series of
amendments "to remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions of a good many people of the
commonwealth and government." H. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1978). After Massachusetts, every
state but Maryland used this formula to ratify, including the crucial states of Virginia and
New York. Id. at 33-34. Indeed, the Constitution was only ratified because the Federalists
pledged to back subsequent amendments to the Constitution. The Bill of Rights, supra note
8, at 313.
When Madison proposed the preparation of a bill of rights to the First Congress in
1789, he did so chiefly to take advantage of the Federalist majority "to finish the unavoidable business of amendments in such a way as to move from the national agenda the major
anti-federalist objections-and incidently to secure some limited but significant improvements in the Constitution, especially in securing individual rights." Storing, supra, at 35.
For a history of the political struggle out of which the Bill of Rights was born, see I.
BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING (1965); The Bill of Rights, supra note
8; CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS, supra, at 72-134; B. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND (1977); Storing, supra.
"0 W. COHEN & J. KAPLAN, BILL OF RIGHTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR UNDERGRADUATES
13-14 (1976).
"1 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 190 S. Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989) (flag burning is expressive
conduct and protected by first amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(advocacy of abstract doctrine of violent political change protected under freedom of speech
clause of first amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1968) (sixth amendment right to trial by jury in criminal proceedings applicable to states); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965) (right of marital privacy and use of contraceptives
within penumbra of specific guarantees of Bill of Rights); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 343-44 (1964) (right to counsel guaranteed by sixth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures of fourth amendment enforceable against states through fourteenth amendment); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (compulsory disclosure of membership lists violates
members' association rights under first amendment); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (cruel and unusual punishment clause of eighth amendment applicable to states through fourteenth amendment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940) (Jehovah witness's playing of record attacking all religions as instruments of Satan
protected under first amendment freedom of religion); De Jorge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362
(1937) (participating in meeting held by Communist Party for lawful purpose protected
under freedom of assembly clause of first amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392 (1914) (under fourth amendment, government may not use evidence obtained illegally by federal law enforcement officers in federal court).
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I will begin by discussing the philosophy of Martin Buber generally. Then, to concretize the use and importance of the philosophy of dialogue in constitutional analysis, I will examine a recent
case, Young v. New York City Transit Authority.1 2 In Young, the
court addressed the issue of whether a total ban on begging or panhandling in the New York City transit system violated freedom of
speech within the meaning of the first amendment.1 3 The district

court found that the ban did violate the first amendment; 14 however, on appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this
decision.'1 Nothing explains the underlying reason for the different
results in the two decisions more clearly than does Martin Buber's
philosophy of dialogue. Nothing supports more strongly my conclusion that Buber's perspective remains critical to any constitutional
analysis founded on justice.
I.

MARTIN BUBER AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE

Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue was, in part, a response
to the time in which he lived, an age scarred by dehumanization
and depersonalization. 16 As a German-Jew, he witnessed and personally experienced this dehumanization."' In spite of his experience, however, Buber "proclaimed that man can achieve authentic
human existence."' 8 He urged humankind to rehumanize its existence by turning to a life of dialogue.' 9
The philosophy of dialogue was also Buber's response to a
12 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
11 Id. at 349. Other issues addressed by the court were whether the total ban on begging
in the Port Authority Bus Terminal violated freedom of speech under the fourteenth
amendment and whether the New York Penal Law section 240.35(1), which prohibits loitering in a public place for the purposes of begging, is violative of the due process clause of the
New York State Constitution. Id.
14

Id. at 359.
See Young, 903 F.2d at 164.

18 B. MARTIN,
17

supra note 1, at 247.

Goodman, Dialogue and Hasidism: Elements in Buber's Philosophy of Education,

73 RELIGIOUS EDUC. 69, 70 (1978); see M.

FRIEDMAN, MARTIN BUBER: THE LIFE OF DIALOGUE
9 (1976) ("With those who took part in [the Holocaust] in any capacity, I, one of the survivors, have only in a formal sense common humanity"). Buber believed that his age in history was an age of the impersonal: "In our age the I-It relation, gigantically swollen, has
usurped, practically uncontested, the mastery and the rule." M. BUBER, ECLIPSE OF GOD 129
(1952).
"I B. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 247; see Winetrout, Buber: Philosopherof the I-Thou
Dialogue, 13 EDUC. THEORY 53, 56-59 (1963).
19 See B. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 250.
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tragic personal experience. Martin Buber had studied mystical
Hasidism and was considered a spiritual advisor. One day, a young
man visited Buber seeking spiritual advice. Shortly thereafter, the
young man committed suicide. In Dialogue,s0 Buber recounted the
visit, admitting that, although friendly toward the young man,
Buber had failed to perceive his underlying need for confirmation
that there is meaning in life.2 ' The young man had looked to find
this meaning in the presence of Buber, as one "who, having taken
his centre in meaning, communicated its activity, power, and reality."'22 Buber, however, had been unable to communicate his presence to the young man because his attachment to mysticism had
closed Buber to the surrounding world.23
As a result of the death of the young man, Buber turned away
25
from mysticism 24 and turned toward a philosophy of dialogue.
A.

The I-Thou Relationship

According to Buber, the I-Thou relationship stands at the
center of the life of dialogue.2" For him, a person does not exist as
an I alone in the world. Rather, a person lives in the world in one
of two primary relationships: the I-Thou relationship or the I-It
20
21

Dialogue, supra note 7, at 13-14.
M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 50. "[Buber] did not meet [the young man's] despair

by a presence by means of which we are told that... there is meaning." Id.
22 A. COHEN, MARTIN BUBER 45 (1957).
23 Id.
at 42; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 50. As a young man, Buber withdrew from
the world for a period of five years to engage in an intensive study of Hasidism so that he
could quell his experience of spiritual confusion. A. COHEN, supra note 22, at 41-42; see B.
MARTIN, supra note 1, at 241-43. His study of Hasidism focused on its mystical side. Id. at
243. Mystical Hasidic teaching emphasizes "ecstatic prayer as the means whereby the individual may at rare moments attain unity with God." Id.
At the time of the young man's visit, Buber had become so self-preoccupied because of
mysticism, that he could not open himself up to the young man's need for help:
A human being is brought (how, one does not know, nor does it matter particularly) into one's way or, as in this case, seeks one out. Presumably a man seeks a
disclosure whether trivial or momentous-and, quite frequently, which is at the
heart of the tragedy, is so beset that he cannot ask directly what his heart knows
to ask. He is met by one (whom indeed he has sought) who is possessed by the
consciousness of truth, indeed wrapped in truth, who yet, in his self-preoccupation, cannot look out upon his fellow.
A. COHEN, supra note 22, at 43-44.
24 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 50; see Dialogue, supra note 7, at 14. "Since then I
have given up the religious .. .or it has given me up." Id.
25 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 50; see A. COHEN, supra note 22, at 44-46.
26 See Dialogue, supra note 7, at 24-25.
" I AND THOU, supra note 2, at 4.
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relationship. Indeed, the I can only come into being "in the act of
speaking one or the other of these primary words."2' 9
The I-Thou relationship is a relationship in which each person
turns to the other in the wholeness of being; each person becomes
present to the other in the wholeness of being; and each person
accepts the other as a unique human being.3 0 The I only really
comes into being as one learns to say Thou. 1 Central to the IThou relationship, therefore, is the requirement of a meeting between the I and Thou; for the I and Thou to become present to
each other, the I "must go out to meet the Thou and step into
'3 2
direct relation with it, and the Thou responds to the meeting.
For Buber, the person who has not entered the world of the I and
Thou has never truly lived because "[a]l real living is meeting."3 3
While the I-Thou is the primary word of relation, the "I-It is
the primary word of experiencing and using."3'4 In the I-It relationship, the I does not turn to the Thou in the wholeness of being.3 5
Instead, the I separates itself from other persons, 6 remaining
outside of the relationship and seeking to secure some advantage
from the other for itself.3 7 In short, in the I-It relationship, the I
treats the other person as an object, a thing to be manipulated-an
"it. '"38 The parties to the relationship are not equal; one is superior, the other, inferior.3 9 This relationship is not genuine because
it does not take place between the I and another, but within the I
40
itself.
11 Id. at 3-4. For Buber, "[t]here is no I taken in itself, but only the I of the primary
word I-Thou and the I of the primary word I-It. When a man says I he refers to one or
other of these." Id. at 4.
29

M.

30 I

FRIEDMAN,

supra note 17, at 57.

THOU, supra note 2, at 11. "The primary word I-Thou can be spoken only with
the whole being. Concentration and fusion into the whole being can never take place
through my agency, nor can it ever take place without me. I become through my relation to
the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou." Id.
31 Id. at 28. "Through the Thou a man becomes L" Id.; see M. FREEDMAN, supra note
17, at 60 (interpreting this passage).
AND

M. FREEDMAN, supra note 17, at 59.
33 1 AND THOU, supra note 2, at 11; see Woocher, Martin Buber's Politics of Dialogue,
22

53

THOUGHT 241, 243 (1978).
24 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 57.
I AND THOU, supra note 2, at 16-18;
I9
I AND THOU, supra note 2, at 24.
I9
37M. FREIDMAN, supra note 17, at 62.

see M.

8 Winetrout, supra note 18, at 54; see I
29

Winetrout, supra note 18, at 54; see I

FREEDMAN,

AND THOU,
AND

supra note 17, at 22-23.

supra note 2, at 4, 22-23, 29-30.

THOU, supra note 2, at 23.

40 See I AND THOU, supra note 2, at 5; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 57. The I-It
relationship is not in itself evil; indeed, it is essential in life. I AND THOU, supra note 2, at 46.
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According to Buber, both relationships are vital to human existence.41 Yet, Buber warned, "[I]n all the seriousness of truth,
hear this: without It42 man cannot live. But he who lives with It
alone is not a man.

B. Essential Characteristicsof the Philosophy of Dialogue
For Buber, the philosophy of dialogue was not merely a philosophy, but a way of life, with the I-Thou relationship standing at its
center. The life of dialogue has numerous aspects;4 3 I will now discuss some of the particularly relevant ones.
According to Buber, a precondition to the life of dialogue is
distancing. 44 In order to have an I-Thou relationship, the I must
set the other at a distance, recognizing the other as an independent
living being opposite to the I. 4 5 Only then can the I enter into rela-

tionship with the other, accepting the other as a complete human
being.46 The relationship entered into is one of "mutual confirmation, co-operation, and genuine dialogue. 47
1. Mutual Confirmation
The I-Thou relationship is first characterized by mutual confirmation. Every person wishes to have his presence confirmed by
his fellow human beings. 48 A self cannot grow and flourish unless it
is confirmed by another self who is conscious of the confirmation
and who also seeks confirmation. 49 According to Buber, the "basis
of man's life.., is twofold, and it is one-the wish of every man to
be confirmed as what he is, even as what he can become, by men;
and the innate capacity in man to confirm his fellow men in this
It is the predominance of the I-It that is evil. See id.
41

See I

AND THOU,

supra note 2, at 16-17. "But this is the exalted melancholy of our

fate, that every Thou in our world must become an It ....
the Thou the eternal butterfly." Id.
42
4

44

Id. at 34.
See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 97.
M. BUBER, Distance and Relation, in THE

The It is the eternal chrysalis,

KNOWLEDGE OF MAN

59-60 (1965) [herein-

after Distance and Relation].
45 Id.
at 61.
48
'

Id. at 62.
Friedman, Introductory Essay, in M. BUBER,

THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN

11, 21 (1965)

[hereinafter Introductory Essay].
48 See Distance and Relation, supra note 44, at 71; see also Dialogue, supra note 7,
at
34-39 (dialogue is giving and "he who gives himself to-morrow is not noted to-day").
" See Distance and Relation, supra note 44, at 71.
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way." 50

For the mutual confirmation of the I and Thou to be realized,
each person must be "made present" to the other; 51 one must imagine concretely what the other person at this very moment is
wishing, feeling, perceiving, and thinking.5 2 Relation is fulfilled
when the I experiences, in the particular approximation of the
given moment, the experience of the other as the other experiences

it.53

When each person makes himself present to the other, he does
so without imposing his own truth on the other; each I is aware of
the other as essentially different, in a definite, unique way, and
accepts the other, "so that in full earnestness I can direct what I
say to [the other] as the person he is."" At the same time, true
confirmation is not necessarily an unqualified acceptance of the
other, but, rather, an 55acceptance and wrestling with the other
against the other's self.
at 67-68.
8, See id. at 70.
52 Id. For Buber,
"[Ilmagining the real" . . . is not a looking at the other, but a bold swinging--demanding the most intensive stirring of one's being-into the life of the
other. This is the nature of all genuine imagining, only that here the realm of my
action is not the all-possible, but the particular real person who confronts me,
whom I can attempt to make present to myself just in this way, and not otherwise,
in his wholeness, unity, and uniqueness, and with his dynamic centre which realizes all these things ever anew.
M. BUBER, Elements of the Interhuman, in THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN 72, 81 (1965) [hereinafter Elements of the Interhuman].
- See Distance and Relation, supra note 44, at 71; see also Elements of the Interhuman, supra note 52, at 80 (awareness is perception of another's spirit which can only
be done when other becomes "present").
54 Elements of the Interhuman, supra note 52, at 79; see M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17,
at 87.
Il Elements of the Interhuman, supra note 52, at 79. According to Buber,
[F]rom time to time I must offer strict opposition to his view about the subject of
our conversation. But I accept this person, the personal bearer of a conviction, in
his definite being out of which his conviction has grown-even though I must try
to show, bit by bit, the wrongness of this very conviction. I affirm the person I
struggle with: I struggle with him as his partner, I confirm him as creature and as
creation, I confirm him who is opposed to me as him who is over against me.
Id. at 79; see Introductory Essay, supra note 47, at 29-30. To distinguish confirmation from
acceptance, Buber stated:
I not only accept the other as he is, but I confirm him, in myself, and then in
him, in relation to this potentiality that is meant by him and it can now be devel50 Id.

oped, it can evolve, it can answer the reality of life ....

Let's take, for example,

man and wife. He says, not expressly, but just by his whole relation to her, "I
accept you as you are." But thus does not mean "I don't want you to change." But
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The mutual confirmation by each person helps the other to
become a self: "the inmost growth of the self is ... accomplished
. . in the making present of another self and in the knowledge
that one is made present in his own self by the other.""6 "It is from
one [person] to another that the heavenly bread of self-being is
'57
passed.
*

2.

Genuine Dialogue

According to Buber, there are three types of dialogue. First,
there is "'technical dialogue,' which is prompted solely by the
need of objective understanding. ' 58 Second, there is "monologue"
"in which two or more [persons] speak each with himself in
strangely tortuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have
escaped the torment of being thrown back on their own resources."5 9 The I-It relationship is merely one of monologue.6 0 Finally, there is "genuine dialogue," that is, the I-Thou dialogue61
The I-Thou dialogue is genuine because each participant in
the dialogue minds the other person as a present being and turns
toward the other to establish a living, mutual relationship. 2 The
essential element of genuine dialogue is "the seeing of the other
side" or the "experiencing of the other side."6 3 A person "experiences the other side" by feeling a shared event "from the side of
' Buber rethe person one meets as well as from one's own side."64
65
fers to this experience as "inclusiveness":
the extension of one's own concreteness, the fulfillment of the actual situation of life, the complete presence of the reality in which
it says, "I discover in you just by my accepting love, I discover in you what you are

meant to become."
Id. at 30.
:" Distance and Relation, supra note 44, at 71.
7 Id.
58 Dialogue,supra note 7, at 19. An example of technical dialogue is explaining how a
pump works. Winetrout, supra note 18, at 53.

Dialogue,supra note 7, at 19.
60

See id.

6! See id.
62 Id.; see Elements of the Interhuman, supra note 52, at 85. "The essential movement
in dialogue is turning toward, outgoing to, and reaching for the other." Johannesen, The
Emerging Concept of Communication as Dialogue, 57 Q. J. oF SPEECH 373, 375 (1971).
63 See M. BUBER, Education, in BarWEEN MAN AND MAN 83, 96 (R.G. Smith trans.
1965) [hereinafter Education].
Friedman, Martin Buber's Philosophy of Education, 6 EDuc. THEORY 95, 96 (1956).
6 See Education, supra note 63, at 97.
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one participates. Its elements are, first, a relation of no matter
what kind, between two persons, second, an event experienced by
them in common, in which at least one of them actively participates, and, third, the fact that this one person, without forfeiting
anything of the felt reality of his activity, at the same time lives
through the common event from the standpoint of the other."

Every I-Thou relationship "is characterized in more or less degree
by the element of inclusion. 6 7
In genuine dialogue, then, each participant in the dialogue
seeks to understand the view of the other participant without foregoing his own views and without imposing his views on the other.68
According to Buber, genuine dialogue has become more and more
difficult to achieve, but the future of humanity depends upon its
rebirth."
3.

Responsibility

For Buber, each person is called to responsibility in one's particular biographical and historical hour.70 One must face this hour
just as it is, in all of its senseless contradiction, and must answer
the call of the hour from the depths of one's being. 1 The historical
hour poses
a question wondrously tuned in the wild crude sound. And he, the
Single One, must answer, by what he does and does not do, he
must accept and answer for the hour, the hour the world, of all of
the world, as that which is given to him, entrusted to him ....
You must hear the claim, however unharmoniously it strikes your
ear-and let no-one interfere; give the answer from the depths,
where a breath of what has been breathed in still hovers-and let
00

Id.

67 Id.

68 See Elements of the Interhuman,supra note 52, at 85.
6 See M. BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 5-10, 20-21, 96-101

(R.G. Smith trans. 1965);
M. BUBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN 76-77 (1965); M. BUBER, POINTING THE WAY 222 (1957).
In Elements of the Interhuman, Buber discussed additional requirements for genuine dialogue. See Elements of the Interhuman, supra note 52, at 85-88. First, the elements of
"mutual confirmation" and "making present" must exist. Id. at 85. In addition, everyone
who takes part in the dialogue must bring himself into it, that is, to say what is really on his
mind without reservation. Id. at 85-86. Not all who participate in the dialogue actually need
speak, "[b]ut each must be determined not to withdraw when the course of the conversation
makes it proper for him to say what he has to say." Id. at 87.
70 See M. BUBER, The Question to the Single One, in BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 40, 66
(R.G. Smith trans. 1965) [hereinafter Question to the Single One].
71 See id.
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no-one prompt you.72

One who accepts the call of the historical hour and who responds to it from the depths of one's being is called a "great
73
character.
I call a great character one who by his actions and attitudes satisfies the claim of situations out of deep readiness to respond with
his whole life, and in such a way that the sum of his actions and
attitudes expresses at the same time4 the unity of his being in its
7
willingness to accept responsibility.

To Buber, the life of dialogue demands that the person responsibly
engage in the social problematics of the realunredeemed-world.7 5
C.

Community and the Life of the Dialogue

In Paths in Utopia,8 Martin Buber stated that community is
"the primary aspiration of all history."7 7 Indeed, in Buber's philosophy, the community and the life of dialogue are inextricably
interwoven. 8
For Buber, true community is based on "the sphere of direct,
mutual relations [which exist] between man and man, [and] genuine dialogue in which each allows the other to exist in his unique
otherness and responds to him in his wholeness and uniqueness."79
Central to the existence of a true community is the potentiality of
I-Thou relationships.8 0 While Buber recognized that human community may incorporate I-It relationships, 8 he believed that true
72

Id.

'3See M.

BUBER,

The Education of Character,in

BETWEEN MAN AND MAN

104, 114

(R.G. Smith trans. 1965).
74 Id. Education is an essential part of the development of the person as one who is able
to respond to the demands of his particular historical situation. See id. at 115-17. However,
"[e]ducation does not mean only teaching, it is also direct relationship, the word spoken at

every occasion." Misrahi, The Dialogue in Practice,

NEW

OUTLOOK MIDDLE EASTERN

MONTHLY 25, 34 (Oct.-Nov. 1966).

Woocher, supra note 33, at 242.
M. BUBER, PATHS IN UTOPIA (1958).
7 Id. at 133.
" Woocher, supra note 33.
7 Friedman, Martin Buber and the Social Problems of Our Time, 12 Yivo ANN. OF
JEWISH Soc. Sci. 235, 240 (1958-59).
80 Id.
S' See I AND THOU, supra note 2, at 47, 48; Woocher, supra note 33, at 244. Woocher
'

stated that, according to Buber, "No common life is possible for man in this world without
the institutionalized structures and the means/end calculi which are necessary for economic,
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community could not exist without the readiness for I-Thou, or
mutually confirming relationships: "in human society at all its
levels persons confirm one another in a practical way to some extent or other in their personal qualities and capacities, and a sociin the measure to which its members
ety may be termed human
82
confirm one another.
When referring to a multitude of individuals, Buber used the
term the "essential We" to correspond "to the essential Thou on
the level of self-being."8 3 He defined the essential We as
a community of several independent persons .... [t]he special
character of [which] ...is, in the holding sway within the We of
an ontic directness which is the decisive presupposition of the IThou relation. The We includes the Thou potentially. Only men
saying Thou to one another can truly say
who are capable of truly
8 4
We with one another.
According to Buber, only through the "essential We" can a person
escape from the impersonal, nameless, faceless crowd which he
termed the "one." 8 5
Buber distinguished true community from individualism and
collectivism. 6 According to Buber, "[i]ndividualism sees man only
in relation to himself, [whereas] collectivism does not see man at
all, it sees only 'society.' ,,s1
True community, however, does not
elevate the individual or the group, but elevates the relationship
between person and person.s
Buber believed that the crisis confronting modern society is
that it has replaced the primacy of the personal relationship with
political, and cultural continuity." Id.
82Distance and Relation, supra note 44, at 67.
83 M. BUBER, What is Man?, in BETWEEN MAN
1965) [hereinafter What is Man?].
M

AND MAN

118, 175 (R.G. Smith trans.

Id. at 175-76.

Id. at 177. "A man is truly saved from the 'one' not by separation but only by being
bound up in genuine communion." Id.
" See id. at 200-05; see also Elements of the Interhuman, supra note 52, at 72-73
(discussing distinction between two realms); M. BUiBER, On the Ethics of PoliticalDecision,
in A BELIEVING HUMANISM, My TESTAMENT 209 (M. Friedman trans. 1967) [hereinafter A
BELIEVING HUMANISM] ("individualism" is catch phrase used when presence of persons of
faith disturbs inner security).
87 What is Man?, supra note 83, at 200.
88 See id. Buber held "the individual to be neither the starting point nor the goal of the
human world." A BELIEVING HUMANISM, supra note 86. At the same time, he asserted the
"collective aims at holding in check the inclination to personal life." Elements of the Interhuman, supra note 52, at 73.
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the primacy of the individual or the group." Individualism and
collectivism, for Buber, are "expression[s] of the same human condition ...

This condition is characterized by the union of cosmic

and social homelessness"9 0 predominant in this modern era. Buber
offers an alternative to individualism and collectivism-personal
relation.
The fundamental fact of human existence is neither the individual as such nor the aggregate as such. Each, considered by itself,
is a mighty abstraction. The individual is a fact of existence in so
far as he steps into a living relation with other individuals. The
aggregate is a fact of existence in so far as it is built up of living
units of relation. The fundamental fact of human existence is
man with man. What is peculiarly characteristic of the human
world is above all that something takes place between one being
and another the like of which can be found nowhere in nature
....
It is rooted in one being turning to another as another, as
this particular other being, in order to communicate with it in a
sphere which is common to them but which reaches out beyond
the special sphere of each. I call this sphere . . . the sphere of
"between"...... This reality, whose disclosure has begun in our

time, shows the way, leading beyond individualism and collectivism, for the life decision of future generations. Here the genuine
third alternative is indicated, the knowledge of which will help to
bring about the genuine person again and to establish genuine
community. 91
Genuine community cannot be achieved unless social institutions are influenced by a "thou-saying, responding spirit."9 2 According to Buber's theory, "[s]tructures of man's communal life
draw their living quality from the riches of the power to enter into
relation." 93 Buber referred to the struggle between the thou-saying
spirit and the world of objectified relationships as the quantum
satis. 4 Buber believed that the quantum satis "could be employed
everywhere-in factories, offices, neighborhoods, government bureaus-in order to transform living and working alongside to living
89 See M. BUBER, What is Common to All, in
[hereinafter What is Common to All].
"0 What is Man?, supra note 83, at 200.
91 Id. at 202-05.
"
I AND THOU, supra

note 2, at 50.

" Id. at 49.

"' See Dialogue, supra note 7, at 37.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN 89,

97 (1965)
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and working with."95
D. Speech and the Life of Dialogue
According to Buber, speech is the key to the relational orientation of his philosophy of dialogue.96 Real dialogue hinges upon
the ability of persons to use some form of speech in order to "place
themselves under the spell and power of the word.""7 Speech for
Buber, therefore, includes not only the spoken word-although the
spoken word is essential to his dialogical principle 9 8-- but also "silent forms of address and communication, such as a glance, a nod
and bodily responses,.
even though audible address may in fact
be totally lacking." 99
In his essay Distance and Relation,10 0 Buber asserted that
speech is "[t]he great characteristic of men's life with one another,
[and] a witness to the principle of human life." 101 Through speech,
persons express themselves in ways which Buber believes animals
cannot, for animals can only call out-"announce themselves"-to
other animals. 1 02 The uniquely human ability to "speak to others
. . . is based on the establishment and acknowledgment of the independent otherness of the other with whom one fosters" a relationship.1 03 At the same time, speech is that which bridges the distance between persons because central to speech is contact with
the other and acceptance of otherness. Accordingly, "[i]f we ever
reach the stage of making ourselves understood only by means of
the dictograph, that is, without contact with one another, the
°
1 04
chance of human growth would be indefinitely lost.
Buber described speech between persons as relational: in our
life with others, "the relation takes on the form of speech.' 05 The
life of dialogue hinges upon speech "spoken with the whole being,"
11

Woocher, supra note 33, at 246; see Dialogue, supra note 7, at 36-39.

" H.

STAHMER, "SPEAK THAT I MAY SEE THEE!": THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF LAN-

184 (1968). "The world is spoken to human beings who perceive it, and the life of
man is itself a dialogue." Id. (quoting M. BUBER, MAMRE 138 (1946)).
9 Id. at 189.
98 See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
I' H. STAHMER, supra note 96, at 189.
100 Distance and Relation, supra note 44, at 68.
GUAGE

101

Id.

Id. at 68 n.1.
at 68.
104 Id. at 69.
105 1 AND THOU, supra note 2, at 101.
103 Id.
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the speech of the I-Thou relationship.
Spirit in its human manifestation is a response of man to his
Thou. Man speaks with many tongues, tongues of language, of
art, of action; but the spirit is one, the response to the Thou
which appears and addresses him out of the mystery. Spirit is the
word. And just as talk in a language may well first take the form
of words in the brain of the man, and then sound in his throat,
and yet both are merely refractions of the true event, for in actuality speech does not abide in man, but man takes his stand in
speech and talks from there; so with every word and every spirit.
Spirit is not in the I, but between I and Thou. It is not like the
blood that circulates in you, but like the air in which you breathe.
Man lives in the spirit, if he is able to respond to his Thou. He is
able to, if he enters into relation with his whole being. Only in
virtue of his power to enter into relation is he able to live in the
spirit. 106
Thus, the sphere of relational speech between persons is the sphere
of mutuality and reciprocity. 10 7 Only in this sphere are the moments of relation here,
and only here, bound together by means of the element of the
speech in which they are immersed. Here what confronts us has
blossomed into the full reality of the Thou. Here alone, then, as
reality that cannot be lost, are gazing and being gazed upon,
knowing and being known, loving and being loved. 08
For Buber, it is only when I connect with another "essentially,"
that is, "in such a way that he is no longer a phenomenon of my I,
but instead is my Thou," that I may experience the reality of
speech with the other. 109
Speech is critical not only to the existence of the I and Thou,
but also to the existence of the true community, -the essential We:
For the word always arises only between an I and a Thou, and the
element from which the We receives its life is speech, the communal speaking that begins in the midst of speaking to one another.
106Id.

at 39.

What is Common to All, supra note 89, at 106 (reciprocal sharing of knowledge is
living "We"). Only in such reciprocity "does the primal word go backwards and forwards in
the same form, the word of address and the word of response live in the one language, I and
Thou take their stand not merely in relation, but also in the solid give-and-take of talk." I
107

AND THOU, supra note 2, at 102-03.
I AND THOU, supra note 2, at
I00

103.

Question to the Single One, supra note 70, at 50-51.
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Speech in its ontological sense was at all times present wherever men regarded one another in the mutuality of I and Thou;
wherever one showed the other something in the world in such a
way that from then on he began really to perceive it; wherever
one gave another a sign in such a way that he could recognize the
designated situation as he had not been able to before; wherever
one communicated to the other his own experience in such a way
that it penetrated the other's circle of experience and supplemented it as from within, so that from now on his perceptions
were set within a world as they had not been before. All this flowing ever again into a great stream of reciprocal sharing of knowledge-thus came to be and thus is the living We, the genuine
110
We.

In his essay, What is Common to All,"' Buber analyzed the
meaning of Heracleitus's statement, "One should follow the common," and posited that, in communal life, persons should join together to build a common world through "human speech-withmeaning, the common logos. 11 2 Only by mutual dialogic speech,
accompanied as it is by all the ambiguities and frailties of the
human situation, can persons discover the common logos. 3s
With the common logos, however, "the response is responsibility. '11 4 Today, persons choose to take refuge from responsibility in
either individualism or collectivism." 5 Such persons no longer really listen to the voice of the other and, therefore, they cannot
know Thou, let alone We."'
The fate of the community, and of humankind itself, depends
upon the common logos,, that is, speech-with-meaning.
110 What is Common to All, supra note 89, at 106.
l Id.
1" Id. at 107. Buber found that:

Heracleitus always remained in accord with the thoroughly sensuous living speech
of his time. For this reason the logos, even in its highest sublimation, does not
cease to be for him the sensuous, meaningful word, the human talk which contains
the meaning of the true. Meaning can be in the word because it is in being. Thus,
it stirs deep in the soul which becomes aware of the meaning; it grows in it and
develops out of it to a voice which speaks to fellow souls and is heard by them,
often, to be sure, without this hearing becoming a real receiving. And like the
logos, so also the cosmos belongs to the common as to that in which men participate as in a common work.
Id. at 98.
113 H. STAHMER, supra note 96, at 209.
11 What is Common to All, supra note 89, at 108.
115
116

Id.
Id.
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In our age, in which the true meaning of every word is en-

compassed by delusion and falsehood, and the original intention
of the human glance is stifled by tenacious mistrust, it is of decisive importance to find again the genuineness of speech and existence as We. This is no longer a matter which concerns small circles that have been so important in the essential history of man;
this is a matter of leavening the human race in all places with
genuine We-ness. Man will not persist in existence if he does not
learn anew to persist in it as a genuine We. 1 '

Buber emphasized that the genuineness of speech does not
mean that participants to dialogue must always agree with, or even
understand, one another. In one of his last major essays, The Word
That Is Spoken,""' Buber stated that priority should be given to
"that speech that occurs at a given moment." 119 Such speech has
priority because "it does not want to remain with the speaker. It
reaches out toward a hearer, it lays hold of him, it even makes the
hearer into a speaker, if perhaps only a soundless one. "120 The notion that agreement or understanding is not a prerequisite to this
living speech, reflects the fact that parties give meaning to the
words spoken based upon their own personal existence.' 2 ' Indeed,
for Buber, ambiguity or misunderstanding
may be fruitful in giving
22
new life to the dialogue.1
Id.
M. BUBER, The Word That is Spoken, in THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN 110 (1965).
,8 Id. at 110. Buber distinguished three modes-of-being of language which are significant in human life. Id. at 111-12. The first mode is called "present continuance" and refers
to "the totality of what can be spoken in a particular realm of language [at a certain segment of time], regarded from the point of view of the person who is able to say what is to be
said." Id. at 110. Second is "potential possession," "the totality of what has ever been uttered in a certain realm of language, in so far as it [limits itself to] what can still today be
lifted by a living speaker into the sphere of the living word." Id. at 110-11. The third mode
is "actual occurrence-its spokenness, or rather being spoken-the word that is spoken." Id.
at 111. While genuine dialogue draws from the first two spheres, for Buber, priority must be
given to the third. Id.
120 Id. at 112.
"' See id. at 112-15.
122 Id. at 114. According to Buber:
From this it follows that it is not the unambiguity of a word but its ambiguity that
constitutes living language. The ambiguity creates the problematic of speech, and
it creates its overcoming in an understanding that is not an assimilation but a
fruitfulness. The ambiguity of the word, which we may call its aura, must to some
measure already have existed whenever men in their multiplicity met each other,
expressing this multiplicity in order not to succumb to it. It is the communal nature of the logos as at once "word" and "meaning" which makes man man, and it
is this which proclaims itself from of old in the communalizing of the spoken word
that again and again comes into being.
'17
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II.

Young v. New York City Transit Authority

In Young v. New York City Transit Authority,123 two homeless men, William Young and Joseph Walley, commenced a class
action to enjoin the enforcement of certain regulations and laws
banning begging and panhandling in the New York City Transit
System and Port Authority facilities.1 2" The plaintiffs solicited
money for themselves throughout the subway system,'125 and, while
doing so, frequently answered any questions passers-by might have
had.126 The plaintiffs asserted that the bans against begging violated the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States
1, sections 6, 8, and 11 of the New York
Constitution and article
127
State Constitution.
The plaintiffs specifically challenged New York City Transit
Authority ("TA") 12 regulation 21 of the New York City Rules and
Regulations ("N.Y.C.R.R.") section 1050.6,129 which in subsection
(b) provides that "[n]o person shall panhandle or beg upon any
facility or conveyance;' 3 0° yet subsection (c) permits solicitation
for religious and political causes as well as for charity by organizations that "(1) have been licensed for any public solicitation ...
or (2) are duly registered as charitable organizations. . ., or (3) are
Id. at 114-15.
123 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
124 Id. at 345. Other plaintiffs included the Legal Action Center for the Homeless and
Sheron Gilmore. Id. at 341. The defendants included the New York City Transit Authority,
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of the State of New York, the Metro-North
Commuter Railroad Company, the Long Island Railroad Company, The Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, Robert R. Kiley, as chairman of the preceding companies, and
Robert Abrams, as Attorney General for the State of New York. Id.
125Id. at 345.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128Id. The original complaint, filed on November 28, 1989, named only the TA, the

Metropolitan Transit Authority ("MTA"), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company
("Metro-North") and Robert Kiley, chairman of the TA. Id.
129 Id. At the onset of the action, 21 New York Codes of Rules and Regulations section
1050.6(b) provided in pertinent part that "no person, unless duly authorized. . . shall upon
any facility or conveyance ... solicit alms, subscription or contribution for any purpose."
[1990] 21 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1050.6(b). In August of 1989, the legislature added subsection (c),
which granted greater utilization of the transit system for certain noncommercial activities,
including solicitation for charitable causes, subject to specific time, place, and manner restrictions. Id. Subsection (c) was revised during the interim between the first oral argument
on December 1, 1989 and the second oral argument on December 18, 1989. Young, 729 F.
Supp. at 345-46.
1o [1990] 21 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1050.6(b).
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exempt from federal income tax."''1 The plaintiffs did not challenge the TA's authority to apply time, place, and manner restrictions, as outlined in section 1050.6(c), to their conduct. 13 2 Rather,

they contested the "defendants' decision to distinguish the plaintiffs from others who permissively solicit contributions for charitable purposes. ' 133
The plaintiffs also challenged Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey ("Port Authority")13 4 regulations,3 "' which govern the
World Trade Center and the Port Authority Bus Terminal; one
provision prohibits any person from soliciting funds for any purpose at the World Trade Center and Port Authority Bus Terminal
without the Port Authority's permission."3 6 Finally, the plaintiffs
challenged New York Penal Law section 240.35(1), s7 which pro1sId. § 1050.6(c).
U22Young, 729 F. Supp. at 345.
These restrictions prohibited the "authorized" non-transit uses in areas not generally open to the public and in subway cars. With the exception of leafletting or
distributing literature, campaigning, public speaking or similar activities with no
sound production device and no physical obstruction, non-transit uses were also
prohibited within twenty-five feet of a token booth or within fifty feet from the
marked entrance to a TA office or tower.
Id. at 344.
122 Id. at 345. In order to inform the public of the revisions, the TA commenced "Operation Enforcement" in October of 1989 and distributed 1.5 million pamphlets, warning that
anyone violating the rules would be subject to arrest, fine, and/or ejection. Id. at 344-45.
The list of prohibited acts included "panhandling or begging." Id. at 345. Additionally, over
20,000 posters were prepared warning that panhandling and begging would lead to arrest,
fine and/or ejection. Id. According to the plaintiffs, TA police had informed them that panhandling and begging were prohibited and that they could be arrested if caught doing so. Id.
Both plaintiffs claimed that, since the commencement of Operation Enforcement, they were
directed to vacate the subway platforms or cars on several occasions. Id.
'" Id. at 347. The Port Authority and the Long Island Railroad were added as defendants on December 27, 1989. Id. at 346-47. On January 22, 1990, the plaintiffs moved to
include "all twelve Commissioners of the Port Authority as defendants, instead of only the
Chairman of the Board of Commissioners." Id. at 347. This motion was granted. Id.
"I Id.; see [1990] 21 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 1220.25, 1290.3.
128 Young, 729 F. Supp. at 347.
12 Id.
at 346; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1990). The Attorney General
was added as a named defendant on December 27, 1989. Young, 729 F. Supp. at 346. The
district court, sua sponte, had previously written to the New York State Attorney General
providing him with the opportunity to intervene in this action. Young v. New York City
Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990). This was done
pursuant to the court's belief that the case "call[ed] into question the constitutionality of
New York Penal Law § 240.35," and prompted by the defendants' assertion that the transit
police, as duly authorized peace officers, were doing no more than enforcing New York Penal
Law section 240.35(1). Young, 729 F. Supp. at 346. Since the Attorney General declined, the
court instructed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint challenging section 240.35 and
naming the Attorney General as a defendant. Id.
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vides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person is guilty of loitering when
he ... loiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the
purpose of begging."1 3 8 Because the Port Authority interprets section 240.35(c) as prohibiting begging and panhandling, it does not
issue permits for these purposes in its facilities." 9
The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to preliminarily enjoin the TA from enforcing 21 N.Y.C.R.R. 1050.6(b) and (c),
and the Port Authority from enforcing 21 N.Y.C.R.R. sections
40
1220.16, 1220.25 and 1290.3 as violative of the first amendment,
and section 240.35 of the New York Penal Code as violative of the
New York State Constitution. M The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and vacated in part,142 and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
A.

The District Court Decision

The district court determined that the plaintiffs had satisfied
the elements of "irreparable harm" and "balance of hardship" required for injunctive relief. 144 The court also found the plaintiffs
likely to prevail on the merits. It took judicial notice of the fact
that cold winter temperatures await those beggars and panhandlers ejected from transit terminals and facilities pursuant to the
regulations. 145 In addition, the court acknowledged that the plain46
tiffs relied on begging and panhandling for their very survival.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 1990).
Young, 729 F. Supp. at 347.

140 Id. at 360. During the first oral argument on December 1, 1989, defendants were
enjoined from displaying and distributing additional posters to further implement Operation Enforcement. Id. at 345. After the second oral argument on December 18, 1989, the
court temporarily restrained the defendants from enforcing the challenged rules insofar as
they prohibited begging or panhandling in any areas in which the-TA authorized charitable

solicitation. Id. at 346.
141 Id. at 359.
142 Young, 903 F.2d at 148.
14 Young, at 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
144 Young, 729 F. Supp. at 348. The district court stated that plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief must "demonstrate that they will suffer an irreparable harm and either (i) that
they are likely to prevail on the merits or (ii) that there exist[s] sufficiently serious questions going to the merits as to make them a fair ground for litigation and that the balance of
hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiffs." Id.
145Id.
148

Id. In addition, the court noted that "the Supreme Court has held that '[t]he loss of

First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.'" Id. at 349 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Thus,
according to the court, by showing that enforcement of the challenged regulations violates
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In holding that the TA regulations violated the first amendment of the Constitution, 47 the court narrowed the issue to
"whether a meaningful distinction can be drawn for First Amendment purposes between a professional fundraiser requesting a donation from a passer-by on behalf of a charitable organization
[which has been found to be protected speech] and a similar request by a destitute person on his own behalf."' 148
In comparing the first amendment rights of the destitute with
those of professional solicitors, the court found no significant distinction between the communicative aspects of either type of begging: "the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source."' 49 The court reasoned that the conduct of both groups is
quite similar; it essentially entails approaching passers-by, requesting donations, and perhaps offering an explanation of why the donation is needed.' 50 For the court, the conduct of both parties "is
in essence, a plea for charity."' 51 Furthermore, to argue that "solicitations for money by beggars have less communicative content
than solicitations by organized charities is to differentiate more on
the basis of the source of the speech then on its content."'5 2 Therefore, according to the court, "[w]hile often disturbing and sometimes alarmingly graphic, begging is unmistakably informative and
their first amendment rights, the plaintiffs "will have demonstrated irreparable injury" and
thus, "the balance of hardships tips decidedly in their favor." Id.
...Id. The first issue the court decided was whether section 240.35 of the New York
Penal Law violated the due process clause of the New York State Constitution. Id. Applying
People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1988), the court stated
that loitering statutes will be upheld "only when they either prohibit[] loitering for a specific illegal purpose or loitering in a specific place of restricted access." Young, 729 F. Supp.
at 349 (citation omitted). The court also held that, absent any provision of New York law
and any clear indication of legislative intent proscribing begging, begging cannot be considered an "illegal purpose." Id. at 349-50.
' Young, 729 F. Supp. at 352. The court examined several Supreme Court cases including Riley v.National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988), Secretary of the
State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984), and Schaumburg v. Citizens for
a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), and observed "charitable solicitations such as those
undertaken by professional fundraisers were 'inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully
protected speech.' "Id. at 352. The district court additionally noted that the Supreme Court
has implied that "a solicitation which was not intended to benefit directly another person
could still warrant protection." Young, 729 F. Supp. at 351.
149 Young, 729 F. Supp. at 352.
150

Id.

151 Id.
152

Id.
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persuasive speech."15 The court further asserted that the activity
in question, beggars requesting money, serves to remind the passers-by that numerous people in the city lack the necessities of life
15 4
and live in utter poverty.
The court also concluded that the intent of the solicitor does
not work to distinguish begging from charitable solicitations.1 5 5
Since charity is defined as "the provision of help or relief to the
poor" or "something that is given to help the needy," ' 6 it is not
relevant to consider who solicits the donation-the fundraiser or
the recipient-in determining whether the donation is for charity.157 The district court therefore concluded that begging can be a
form of expression protected by the first amendment.
The court then considered whether the New York City Transit
System and the Port Authority were public fora for the purposes
of first amendment protection. Following Wolin v. Port Authority
of New York,1 5 8 in which the Second Circuit found that the Port
Authority Terminal was an appropriate public forum for protected
first amendment speech, the court held that the Port Authority
Terminal and facilities similar to it are public fora.1 59 The court
also determined that the New York City Transit System is a public
forum. Because the TA's regulations permit a broad spectrum of
expression by any member of the public who wishes to be heard,
the court concluded that the TA intended to open the forum to
53
154

Id.
Id.

'8 Id. at 353.
1i0Id.

Id. According to the court, there is nothing historically to suggest that begging has
been "universally viewed with the rancor and enmity of, say, obscenity." Id. (citations omitted). Early English law prohibited begging by those able to work but not by those unable to
work. Id. The crime of vagrancy in nineteenth century New York encompassed "solicitation
of alms or charity by the 'able bodied or sturdy' and 'wandering abroad and begging."' Id.
at 354. However, currently in the United States only 25 states have statutes pertaining to
begging. Id. Thirteen of these statutes grant powers to various state authorities to regulate
or punish begging (or some variation) but do not themselves proscribe begging. Id. Two
statutes adopt the old common-law rule, four statutes resemble New York's penal provision,
and the rest proscribe either begging or some variation thereof. Id. In addition, several state
courts have reached different results when statutory or regulatory provisions similar to the
type at issue in this case have been considered. Id. The court stated that "[t]hese cases
reveal that the constitutional protection afforded solicitation of money by beggars, as well as
society's general attitude toward begging, are far from resolved." Id. at 355-56.
158 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). The Wolin court held that
the terminal was properly considered a public forum for the "distribution of leaflets, carrying placards, setting up card tables, and engaging in conversations with others." Id. at 91.
1I
Young, 729 F. Supp. at 356.
1.7
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public assembly and debate. 160
Finally, the district court found that the TA and Port Authority regulations prohibiting all begging from all of their facilities
were not narrowly tailored, either as time, place, or manner restrictions or as content-based exclusions, to serve a significant state interest.16 1 The court stated that although the state has an interest
in protecting the public from harassment and intimidation, neither
the TA nor the Port Authority attempted "to distinguish between
an innocuous request for money and a threatening or intimidating
demand."' 6 2 Nor was any attempt made to identify the specific vicinities where passers-by might be confronted with harassment
and intimidation from beggars or where passers-by become a captive audience. 63 The court noted here that the TA had previously
promulgated regulations that expressly prohibited intimidating
and harassing behavior.'
While the government has an interest in "preserv[ing] the quality
of urban life.... and in protecting citizens from 'unwanted exposure to certain methods of expression which may legitimately be
deemed a public nuisance," . . . this interest must be discounted
where the regulation has the principle effect of keeping a public
problem involving human beings out of sight and therefore out of
mind. Indeed, it is the very unsettling appearance and message
conveyed by the beggars that gives their conduct its expressive
1 65
quality.
The expressive quality conveyed by a beggar's unsettling appearance and message does not lose its protected status simply because
some people may find it objectionable. 6 6
B.

The Second Circuit Decision

In reversing the lower court's decision, the Second Circuit examined the case from a different perspective. It focused on the
problems associated with begging in the subways, especially the

161

Id. at 357.
See id. at 359.

162

Id. at 358.

160

163 Id.

'

Id.; see [1990] 21 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 1050.6(a), 1050.7(i), 1050.7(k).
Young, 729 F. Supp. at 358 (citations omitted).
166 Id.
at 358-59. Moreover, the court reasoned that the likelihood of deception and
fraud are greatly diminished in this case because passers-by know that a beggar will most
likely keep the money and, based on this knowledge, make a calculated decision that the
individual is worthy in some respect to receive it. See id. at 359.
165
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heightened fear of the commuting public. 67 The court ultimately
concluded that the regulations in question, reasonably constructed
to address such problems, did not infringe on any potential communicative content of begging or panhandling." 8
Relying on a 1988 study initiated by the TA which, according
to the court, disclosed that "begging contributes to a public perception that the subway is fraught with hazard and danger," 6 9 the
court stated that many passengers have complained of "unwanted
touching, detaining, impeding," and intimidation from beggars demanding money. 17 0 The court accepted the conclusions of an
outside consulting company, retained during the study-process,
that the passengers' begging-related fears discouraged the use of
the transit system. 7 1 As a result, begging was identified as inherently aggressive in the subway environment; it was also found to
potential of creating an accident and injuring
"ha[ve] the serious
72
many people."'
In examining the regulations' free speech implications, the
court first found that begging does not constitute the kind of expressive conduct protected by the first amendment.' It noted that
the Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson14 had "admonished
against... label[ing conduct as] 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.' 7 5
Rather, the court set its task as considering whether begging involves "an intent to convey a particularized message . . . and
167 Young, 903 F.2d at 149-50.
168 Id. at 158-59.
1609Id. at 149. The Second Circuit stated that additional evidence before the district

court demonstrated that the subway system transports millions of passengers each day, its
platforms are crowded, and its basic structural features are timeworn. Id. A research survey
had revealed that two-thirds of the subway ridership have experienced intimidation which
resulted in their giving money to beggars, whose pervading presence in the subway is a
significant problem. Id. The survey also reported that "it is difficult from the police perspective to draw the fine line between panhandling and extortion." Id.
170 Id.
1
Id. at 149-50. According to the court, the consulting company found that on the
open city streets people are able to avoid and move away from intimidating persons, but in
the subway, the riders' movements are restricted and there is less ability to control what
happens to them. Id. at 150.
172 Id. at 150. Statistics revealed that during a 10 month period in 1989, an average of
six homeless persons per month died in the subway, including 15 who were hit by trains. Id.
17 Id. at 154.
174 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
M Young, 903 F.2d at 152-53 (citing Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2539). The Young court
also noted that the Johnson Court's caution that the government has more freedom to restrict expressive conduct than spoken or written words. Id. at 153.
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whether the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it."' 17
The Second Circuit found that speech is simply not the essence of this conduct. 17 Begging is not inseparably intertwined
with a particularized message; rather, it is an activity whose goal is
the collection of money. Therefore, common sense, according to the
court, dictates that begging is more conduct than speech.178 Furthermore, the court determined it likely that a passer-by will be
unable to discern the content of a particular message even should
one be offered. 179 Unlike other forms of expressive conduct, "begging in the subways is experienced as transgressive conduct
whether devoid of or inclusive of an intent to convey a particularized message."' ° While the court did not doubt that begging may
sometimes involve incidental speech,' 8 ' the court asserted that the
only message commonly shared by all acts of begging is the desire
"to exact money from those 8[accosted]";
thus, begging falls outside
2
first amendment protection.

The Second Circuit strongly disagreed with the district court's
construction of Supreme Court precedent regarding the nexus between solicitation by organized charities and a "variety of speech
interests" sufficient to invoke constitutional protection.8 3 The Second Circuit indicated that the district court's inability to detect a
distinction between such solicitation and begging led to its8 errone4
ous conclusion that begging should be similarly protected.
[T]he difference between begging and solicitation by organized charities . . . must be examined not from the imaginary
18 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
177

178

Id.
Id.

Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 154 (citation omitted).
181 Id. The court stated:
We do not doubt that the proscribed activity may sometimes involve speech and
upon occasion even give rise to the exchange of speech. We do not accept, how17

180

Id.

ever, that this incidental speech is one and the same as the conduct being regulated. Actual speech which may arise as an incident to conduct is not at issue here.
The regulation at stake does not prevent any individual from speaking to passengers. Further, the First Amendment protects speech and not every act that may
conceivably occasion engagement in conversation.
182

Id.

Id. at 155. On the contrary, absent solicitation by organized charities, the flow of
information would likely cease. Id.
183

184Id.
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heights of Mount Olympus but from the very real context of the
New York City subway. While organized charities serve community interests by enhancing communication and disseminating
ideas, the conduct of begging and panhandling in the subway
amounts to nothing less than a menace to the common good. 185

The court therefore deferred to the TA's judgment that the
"problems posed by begging and panhandling could be addressed
by nothing less than [their] total ban." '
Although recognizing that giving alms has long been considered virtuous, the court suggested that this "virtue is best served
when it reflects an 'ordered charity,'" consistent with the TA regulations. 1 87 The court further indicated that its role is not to solve
all the problems of the homeless, but merely to determine whether
the TA may properly ban from the subway system that which it
finds to be inherently harmful. 8 "
In its determination, the court applied the relatively lenient
level of judicial scrutiny enunciated in United States v. O'Brien.8 '
The court thus upheld the regulations because they proscribed
conduct whose governmental interest was unrelated to the suppression of free speech. 9 0
The court first held that the regulations were within the TA's
rule-making authority.' 9 ' Second, the court determined that the
:85 Id. at 156 (citation omitted).
1 Id. The court found that the record disclosed evidence of passengers feeling intimi-

dated by beggars only, not by organized charities. Id.
187 Id.
188Id. at 156-57.
189 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see Young, 903 F.2d at 157. Generally, this more lenient level of
judicial scrutiny requires the court to balance the extent to which communicative activity is
in fact inhibited against the values, interests or rights served by enforcing the inhibition. Id.
The court noted that O'Brien states that "'a government regulation is sufficiently justified'
when: (1) 'it is within the constitutional power of the Government;' (2) 'it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;' (3) 'the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression;' and (4) 'the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.'" Id.; see
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
190 Young, 903 F.2d at 157. Government regulation of expressive conduct may abridge
in one of two ways; "[a] law directed at the communicative nature of conduct must, like a
law directed at speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of need that the First
Amendment requires," or "[a]lternatively, a regulation may proscribe particular conduct in
order to protect a 'governmental interest ... unrelated to the suppression of free expression.'" Id. (citation omitted).
1"1 Id. at 158. The court stated that the district court entirely passed over the plaintiffs'
claim that the regulation was outside the TA's rule-making authority. Id. Nonetheless, according to the court, pursuant to New York Public Authority Law section 1204, the TA does
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regulations advanced a substantial governmental interest in providing the public with reasonably
safe, propitious, and benign
92
means of public transportation.

Third, the court found that the governmental interests relied
on in the regulation are unrelated to the suppression of free expression.19 The regulation does not facially restrict expression; nor

does the record indicate that the TA's interest in prohibiting begging was in any way based on its objection to a particularized idea
or message.19 4 Rather, the justifications giving rise to the regulation
were passenger well-being and safety, as well as the smooth and
efficient operation of the system, independent of any alleged communicative element. 195
The court concluded that "the exigencies created by begging
and panhandling in the subway warrant the conduct's complete
prohibition."'"" Contrary to the district court, the Second Circuit
found persuasive well-settled precedent that time, place, and manner restrictions on expressive conduct do not violate the first
amendment, simply because a less burdensome alternative may
7
9

exist.1

Though regulations must be narrowly tailored to serve the
government's legitimate content-neutral interests, the court found
that "[t]he TA's judgment is consistent with the Supreme Court's
rule that the 'narrow tailoring' requirement is satisfied 'so long as
the.., regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' "I's Additionally, the court stated that because the TA prohibits begging
only in the subways, the TA's regulations left open ample alternative channels of communication.'99
in fact have a "broad statutory mandate to promulgate rules 'governing the conduct and
safety of the public as it may deem necessary, convenient or desirable ....including without
limitation rules relating to the protection or maintenance of such facilities and the conduct
and safety of the public."' Id.; see N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1204 (McKinney 1982 & Supp.
1991).
19 Young, 903 F.2d at 158.
193Id.

'0' Id. at 158-59.
191 Id. at 159.
196 Id.

Id.
"I Id. at 160 (citation omitted).
199Id. The court stated, "It is untenable to suggest, as do the plaintiffs, that absent the
opportunity to beg and panhandle in the subway system, they are left with no means to
communicate to the public about needy persons." Id. The court relied on the Supreme
107
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The court next addressed, in dictum, the district court's determination that the subway is a public forum in which begging and
panhandling must be permitted.200 According to the court, the government creates a public forum "only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse." '0 The court asserted
that the TA's enforcement demonstrated its intent to continue its
long-standing prohibition of begging and panhandling, notwithstanding the regulation's revision to permit organizational solicitation.20 Furthermore, the TA could permissively "limit solicitation
in the subway system to organizations. 2 s0 3 The court explained: "A

public forum may be created by government designation of a place
or channel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects."204 The court further maintained that the
TA never intended to designate any portion of the subway system
as an appropriate forum for begging and panhandling.
Nor does the amended regulation abrogate our holding in Gannett Satellite that the subway system is not a traditional or designated public forum. The amended regulation demonstrates the
TA's concern to safeguard the system and to honor the First
Court's decision in Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
Young, 903 F.2d at 160. In Clark, the plaintiffs were denied permission to sleep in symbolic
tents in a public park in connection with a demonstration intended to call attention to the
plight of the homeless. Clark, 468 U.S. at 291-92. The request was denied due to a regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks. Id. at 290-91. The Court held that the regulations
were content-neutral and narrowly focused on the substantial governmental interest in
maintaining the intact condition and attractiveness of the parks. Id. at 299.
2 Young, 903 F.2d at 161.

Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985)). The court further noted that "the Supreme Court has explained: 'We will not find
that a public forum has been created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent,...
nor will we infer that the government intended to create a public forum when the nature of
the property is inconsistent with expressive activity.'" Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
803).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (emphasis in original)). The Second Circuit
finally considered the district court's determination that section 240.35(1) of the New York
Penal Code violated the due process clause of the New York State Constitution. Id. at 162.
The court held that the issue was not within the district court's jurisdiction because section
240.35(1) did not prohibit the plaintiffs from begging or panhandling; neither had they applied for a permit to beg from the Port Authority, thereby triggering a denial of permit
based on section 240.35(1). Id. at 163. Because the plaintiffs had demonstrated neither direct injury nor imminent danger of direct injury, the fundamental prerequisites of jurisdiction had not been satisfied; the court therefore vacated the district court's holding. Id. at
163-64.
201
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Amendment. Confronted with the district court's holding, a cynic
might remind the TA that "no good deed goes unpunished."2 5
Judge Meskill dissented from the majority opinion, asserting
that begging is speech protected by the first amendment.20° He disagreed with the distinction in communicative content drawn by the
majority between begging for one's self and solicitation for organized charities.207 He argued that because both beggars and organized charities who send representatives into the subway have the
same primary goal, beggars deserve the same protections afforded
to charitable organizations.20 8 In addition, Judge Meskill stated
that a charity's representatives, similar to beggars, "often explain
the purpose of ... [their] work to potential donors and perhaps
engage in a discussion regarding social issues. ' 20 Judge Meskill
pointed out that the "[p]laintiffs . . . all state in their affidavits
that they often speak with potential donors about subjects such as
the problems of the homeless and poor, the perceived inefficiency
of the social service system in New York and the dangerous nature
of the public shelters in which they sometimes sleep." 1 0 A beggar
is also engaged in first amendment activity when holding a sign
that reads, "'Help the Homeless' or 'I am hungry.' ",211 He therefore concluded that the first amendment protects the speech and
association inherent in these encounters.21 2
According to the dissent, the majority's suggestion that individuals are free to engage in first amendment activities so long as
they do not request donations was rejected by the Supreme
Court.21 3 While the majority acknowledged that a charitable organId. at 162.
Id. at 164 (Meskill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Meskill concurred with the majority opinion vacating the district court's invalidation of New York Penal Law section 240.35(1). Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).
207 Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 164-65 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at 165 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
20
200

210 Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).

Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).
Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).
213 Id.; see Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 628 (1980). At issue
in Schaumburg was the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations that did not use at least 75 percent of their receipts for
charitable purposes. Id. at 622. In striking down the statute, the Court held that charitable
solicitation is protected because "it is characteristically intertwined with ... speech seeking
support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues."
Id. at 632.
211
212
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ization would likely cease its advocacy and dissemination of ideas
if unable to solicit donations, it failed to recognize that a beggar's
communicative activity is no less dependent on requests for
money.21 Judge Meskill characterized the majority's speculation
that beggars could get jobs and spend their free time distributing
leaflets or discussing issues of their plight with passengers as unsupported by the record and imperceptive of the harsh experience
of life of the urban poor.21
In addition, Judge Meskill identified the TA System and Port
Authority Bus Terminal as limited public forums. 1 By designating certain areas of the subway system as appropriate places for
charitable solicitation, the TA has clearly created a limited public
forum.21 7 Judge Meskill agreed with the district court that the
precedential value of Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.
Young, 903 F.2d at 165 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
Id. at 165-66 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Judge Meskill stated:
In the seclusion of a judge's chambers, it is tempting to assume that beggars could
obtain jobs and spend their free time distributing leaflets or buttonholing passersby in the subway to further the cause of the homeless and poor. The record in
this case, however, permits no such speculation. Plaintiff Young states in his affidavit, for example, that he solicits money in the subway so that he can buy food,
medicine and other essentials, and take the subway to the Bronx, where he sometimes earns enough money unloading trucks to rent a room for the night. He receives no public assistance. Plaintiff Walley, who is fifty years old, states that he
solicits donations because he is unable to find work. If he sleeps in a shelter, he
receives reduced public assistance of $21.50 every two weeks. Plaintiff Gilmore's
solicitation also is the result of her need for food and medical treatment. To suggest that these individuals, who are obviously struggling to survive, are free to
engage in First Amendment activity in their spare time ignores the harsh reality
of the life of the urban poor.
Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 166-67 (Meskil, J., dissenting). In recognizing that the pervading presence of
beggars in the subway presents a serious problem for the TA and contributes to the sense of
chaos and frustration, Judge Meskill stated that had the TA not created a designated public
forum in the subway by permitting charitable solicitation, he would have not had any problem with upholding the regulations. Id. at 168 (Meskill, J., dissenting). But having done so,
the TA should not be able to "permit organized charities, but not beggars, to rattle a cup
full of change as one passes by." Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 166 (Meskill, J., dissenting). While governmental intent is critical to the determination that a limited public forum was created, Judge Meskill concluded that since begging is indistinguishable from charitable solicitation for first amendment purposes, the
"[d]efendants therefore may not open the door to the latter while slamming it in the face of
the former." Id. at 167 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the defendants failed to submit any evidence that charitable solicitation does not have the same adverse effects as they
concluded begging to have. Id. at 167 & n.1 (Meskill, J., dissenting). As a result, the "defendants' contention that begging is not of the same general nature as solicitation by organized charities is nothing more than rank speculation." Id. at 167 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
214
211
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v. Metropolitan TransportationAuthority21 8-that commuter stations are neither traditional nor designated public fora-is
219
slight.
Judge Meskill criticized the majority's construction that
"holding the regulation content-neutral automatically means that
it must be analyzed under ... the 'relaxed' standard of United

States v. O'Brien.' 220 Since begging, like charitable solicitation, is
protected speech, a New York direct restriction is subject to "exacting First Amendment scrutiny. '221 Moreover, cases applying
O'Brien generally have involved symbolic conduct rather than
speech in the usual sense of the word.222
In Young, however, the TA regulations were not narrowly tailored to achieve the defendants' interests; rather, Judge Meskill
contended that the complete ban on begging "burden[s] a substantial amount of speech that does not implicate the TA's interests. '223 The regulation failed to distinguish between harmless passive begging and aggressive behavior which intimidates
passengers.224 Significantly, the TA had not shown "that passengers perceive all, or even a large percentage, of people who solicit
alms in the subway as belligerent or frightening. '225 Nor had the
defendants demonstrated that passengers "do not feel harassed
'226
when approached by representatives of an organized charity.

M
219

745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984).
Young, 903 F.2d at 167 (Meskill, J., dissenting). According to the court, Gannett

was decided prior to the TA's creation of a designated forum for charitable solicitation. Id.
(Meskill, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Judge Meskill believed a re-examination of Wolin,
392 F.2d 83, was necessary because "those areas in which the Port Authority allows expressive activities to take place constitute a designated public forum for the same reasons set
forth above with respect to the subway system." Young, 903 F.2d at 167 (Meskill, J.,
dissenting).
22 Young, 903 F.2d at 166 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
221 Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487
U.S. 781, 789 (1988)).

222 Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting). Judge Meskill argued that "[tihe protected expression
in this case is the beggars' speech incident to their solicitation of alms, not symbolic conduct." Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).
222 Id. at 167 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 168 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
221 Id.
226Id.

(Meskill, J., dissenting).
(Meskill, J., dissenting).
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III.

A

BUBERIAN APPROACH TO

Young

Young is the quintessential example of a case in which the
analysis of a constitutional issue requires a dialogical orientation.
The legal arguments on each side of the first amendment issue and
subissues in Young are very closely weighted. On the level of
purely technical analysis, the decision could have been, and indeed
was, decided in favor of either the needy plaintiffs or the defendants. However, mere technical analysis is insufficient; because the
issue involved the potential denial of individual rights, and because its resolution will have far-reaching ramifications for the
poor, the analysis requires an I-Thou approach. Constitutionally,
the decision in Young could have effectively weakened or strengthened the voices of the weakest members of society-the destitute
and the homeless. Moreover, Young could have helped or hurt
their chances of survival by permitting or denying their access to
warmer shelter as well as to monies that could be used for basic
needs such as food and medicine.
A. District Court Decision and the Meskill Dissent
The district court's holding-as well as the Meskill dissent-in Young, reflect a dialogical orientation that can be seen as
incorporating each of the philosophy's essential characteristics.
First, confirmation is present. The very physical survival of the
poor must be guaranteed or at least facilitated as a prerequisite to
selfhood. Recognizing this, the district court took judicial notice of
the cold weather awaiting beggars ejected from the transit system,
and acknowledged that the homeless plaintiffs beg in the subway
system to obtain funds for their basic needs.
In addition, the physical presence of the poor in the transit
system communicates the reality of their experience of poverty to
all. Begging in transit facilities reveals to each of us the true-to-life
existence of the destitute and homeless: their need of a warmer
place to stay during the cold weather, their need to beg for money,
and the inadequacy of the welfare and social security systems to
provide for all, or most, of their needs. Their presence enables us
to imagine and empathize with what the poor must feel, perceive,
and think. We can do so because we can see their surroundings and
appearance, hear them or see them beg, and listen to them discuss-in spoken and written words, or even in the mere rattling of
a cup-the reasons for begging. We may even have the opportunity
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to speak with them to understand further their plight.
Neither the district court nor Buber himself would require us
to give money to the beggar; the truth of the poor person is not
forced upon us, but simply made apparent to us. We then can
choose to engage in a struggle to learn the truth of each other's
existence, and perhaps, in some circumstances, even to rectify our
indifference or the cause of the person's poverty. Martin Buber's
notions of confirmation and genuine dialogue were given effect by
the district court's decision because the very existence of the poor
person would have been made present to us, and because we are
able to "see" or "experience" the other side.
Our historical hour presents the crises of poverty and homelessness. The issue in Young placed the court squarely in the midst
of these crises. The district court heard and responded to responsibility's call echoing from the subway system and bus terminal. It
looked beyond the governmental interest in sheltering citizens
from "unwanted exposure to certain methods of expression which
may legitimately be deemed a public nuisance, ' 227 to the fact that
the defendants asking that the government enforce regulations
whose principal effect would keep "a public problem involving
human beings out of sight and therefore out of mind. ' 228 The court
also refused to turn a deaf ear to the call to responsibility, stating
that beggars requesting money "cannot but remind [us] that people in the city live in poverty and often lack the essentials for
survival."22 9
In looking beyond the government's interest in preserving the
quality of urban life and minimizing exposure to publicly annoying
expression, the district court ignored the call of collectivism. It realized that true community cannot exist where the poor are placed
out of sight and out of mind; it maintained instead that such community thrives only where the possibility of dialogue and meeting
among all people-even the poor-is enhanced. The court permitted itself to be influenced by the "thou-saying, responding spirit,"
and implicitly encouraged the quantum satis by refusing to deny
first amendment protection to begging in transit facilities.
The district court's holding that begging warrants first amendment protection comports with the key role of speech in Martin
227

Young, 729 F. Supp. at 358 (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for

Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984)).
228

22

Id.
Id. at 352.
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Buber's philosophy of dialogue. First, like Buber, the court understood that spoken words and conduct equally can constitute
speech. Second, the court's finding that the inherent worth of
speech does not depend on the speaker's identity, accords with the
notion that all participants in the I-Thou dialogue are equal.
Third, the district court acknowledged that speech can be a witness to the principle of human life, for begging demonstrates the
principle of the human life of the extremely poor. Fourth, the district court understood that the potential interaction between the
beggar and the passer-by could create the basis for true community; if we are forced to see and hear the beggar, we may be moved
to do something about the problems of poverty and homelessness.
Finally, the district court acknowledged that the mere possibility
that we might misunderstand or disagree with the message conveyed by begging does not diminish the protection such speech deserves; in fact, the potential for miscommunication may entitle
begging to greater protection.
The opinions of both the district court and Judge Meskill's
dissent declined to elevate the needs of organizations, however
charitable, over those of persons who are destitute; they each refused to create a distinction based on the status of the solicitor. As
stated by Judge Meskill: "To hold otherwise would mean that an
individual's plight is worthy of less protection in the eyes of the
law than the interests addressed by an organized group. No court
has ever so ruled. ' 23 0 The linchpin of the district court's constitutional analysis was its admittedly dialogical orientation: "A true
test of one's commitment to constitutional principles is the extent
to which recognition is given to the rights of those in our midst
'2 31
who are the least affluent, least powerful and least welcome.
Through its dialogical orientation, the district court achieved what
should be the highest goal of the Bill of Rights: the confirmation of
poor persons on the level of both basic human rights (including
freedom of speech) and basic human needs (including warmer shelter and money for food, clothing, and medicine). The same cannot
be said, however, of the Second Circuit decision.
B.

Second Circuit Decision
In its language and reasoning, the Second Circuit decision re2:0

Young, 903 F.2d at 167 (MeskiU, J., dissenting).

231 Young, 729 F. Supp. at 360.
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fiects the world of the I-It: cold, objectified, and analytical. For
example, the court stated:
Common sense tells us that begging is much more "conduct"
than it is "speech." As then Circuit Judge Scalia once remarked:
"That this should seem a bold assertion is a commentary upon
how far judicial and scholarly discussion of this basic constitutional guarantee has strayed from common and common-sense
understanding." Here, what comon sense beckons the law ordains.
• ..The only message we are able to espy as common to all
acts of begging is 2that
beggars want to exact money from those
32
whom they accost.

It further insisted that any
difference [between begging and solicitation] must be examined
not from the imaginary heights of Mount Olympus but from the
very real context of the New York City subway. While organized
charities serve community interests by enhancing communication
and disseminating ideas, the conduct of begging and panhandling
in the subway amounts to nothing less than a menace to the common good.223
The court finally stated that "[t]he amended regulation demonstrates the TA's concern to safeguard the system and to honor the
First Amendment. Confronted with the district court's holding, a
cynic might remind the TA that 'no good deed goes
unpunished.' "234
In this I-It world, we do not turn to the poor with the wholeness of our being. Instead, we seek to separate ourselves by removing them from the transit system where their presence becomes too
real to us. The poor, in the world of the I-It, are not human beings;
rather, they are a "menace to the common good, ' 23 5 and a "public
nuisance. ' ' 2 31 Moreover, they are not even entitled to the same con-

stitutional rights guaranteed to charitable organizations.
The Second Circuit decision ensures that the poor are not
truly made present to us. We are not allowed to see or experience
their real-life existence, their sitz-in-leben. The reality is that, par22
:3

Young, 903 F.2d at 153-54 (citations omitted).
Id. at 156 (citation omitted).

234 Id. at 162.
235Id. at 156.
136 Id. (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789,
805 (1984)).
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ticularly during the winter months, they must be in a warmer
place, such as the subway station, and must solicit money. The
court ignored their sitz-in-leben, stating that "the regulation at issue 'leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication.'
Under the regulation, begging is prohibited only in the subway, not
throughout all of New York City. ' 237 Moreover, the court went
even further than the TA, which does not enforce section 1050.6
against the homeless8 when the temperature falls below thirty-two
23
degrees fahrenheit.
The Second Circuit in Young flatly sidestepped answering the
call of this historical hour which could have helped mitigate the
problems of poverty and homelessness. The court disingenuously
characterized the plaintiffs' request as imposing on the court the
task of resolving all the problems facing the homeless. 2 39 On the
contrary, it was only being asked to recognize the constitutional
rights of the poor as well as the decision's likely impact on their
survival, and to extend first amendment protection to begging in
transit facilities subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.
The Second Circuit's decision reflects the I-It world for several additional reasons. First, the court misperceived the intent of
those who beg in the transit system as always intimidating or
harassing the passengers solicited; similarly, the court misjudged
the passengers' reaction as invariably fearful whether or not the
poor person is intimidating. Evidence of this misconception is in
the court's statement that "[t]he only message ... common to all
acts of begging is that beggars want to exact money from those
'240
whom they accost.
Second, the court exclusively relied on the TA's study to support its analysis, discussing at length the district court's lack of
deference to the study. The Second Circuit itself failed to discuss
an opposing affidavit by Robert N. Bontempo, 241 which characterId. at 160 (citation omitted).
Joint App. at 111, Young, 903 F.2d 146.
2'0 Young, 903 F.2d at 156.
We take this opportunity, therefore, to suggest that it is not the role of this court
to resolve all the problems of the homeless, as sympathetic as we may be. We
must fulfill the more modest task of determining whether the TA may properly
ban conduct that it finds to be inherently harmful in the subway system.
Id. at 156-57.
240 Id. at 154.
241 Joint App. at 253-62, Young, 903 F.2d 146. Mr. Bontempo, from Columbia Univer237
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ized the survey as seriously flawed and biased.242
Third, the court ignored the fact that the law already proscribes intimidating or harassing behavior, by the homeless or any
one else.243 Further, the court disregarded the plaintiffs' agreement, existing from the outset, to be subject to reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions, which would exclude them from areas where their presence might be considered more intimidating by
passengers.
The Second Circuit decision elevates the collective over the
genuine We. Purported "common sense" and "common understanding" influence the decision. Begging in transit facilities does
not deserve protection because begging is a "menace" and a "detriment to the common good," engendering fear in the commuting
public. No consideration is given, however, to what is good for the
homeless and destitute. Furthermore, the court did not consider
the importance for the community of "the sphere of direct relations between [person and person], genuine dialogue in which each
allows the other to exist in his unique otherness and responds to
him in his wholeness and uniqueness. "244
The court emphasized the needs of the subway's commuting
patrons, thereby elevating the collective:
[The subway] is the primary means of transportation for literally
millions of people of modest means, including hard-working men
and women, students and elderly pensioners who live in and
around New York City and who are dependent on the subway for
the conduct of their daily affairs. They are the bulk of the subway's patronage, and the City has an obvious interest in providing them with a reasonably safe, propitious and benign means of
public transportation. In determining the validity of the bans we
must be attentive lest a rigid, mechanistic application of some legal doctrine gainsays the common good. In our estimation, the
sity, is an expert "on the methodology and analysis of survey research." Id. at 254.
242 Id. at 253. Further, Mr. Bontempo stated that the survey demonstrated that

the public views beggars more with sympathy than fear. If panhandling has any
deleterious effects on the transit system, according to the survey those effects are
not of concern to the vast majority of subway riders. The vast majority of riders
do not want increased police sanctions against beggars, and clearly consider other
problems such as loud radios, delays, and dirt as far more serious problems in the
subway.
Id. at 261-62.
24 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1989); see also supra notes 137-39 and
accompanying text (discussing Port Authority's interpretation of loitering statute).
244 Friedman, supra note 79.
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regulation at issue here is justified by legitimate, indeed compelling, governmental interests. We think that the district court's
analysis reflects an exacerbated deference to the alleged individual rights of beggars
and panhandlers to the great detriment of
24 5
the common good.
This troubling statement reveals that the court's concern extended
to virtually every group but the poor and homeless. Furthermore,
despite its exhortation against the mechanistic application of first
amendment protection, the court mechanistically denied such protection to the poor and the homeless. In determining whether begging is speech or conduct 246 and in deciding what standard of judicial scrutiny to apply,247 the Second Circuit relied on the precedent
established in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,248
which itself denied first amendment protection to homeless persons sleeping in public parks outside the White House. 49
The Second Circuit's decision fails to promote genuine community because it does not create the readiness for I-Thou relationships. Without genuine community, the poor and homeless will
continue to be part of the "nameless, faceless crowd" and the
problems of poverty and homelessness will remain unchanged.
The Second Circuit in Young refused to grasp the essential
revelatory, relational, and communal aspects of speech. Speech, for
Buber, primarily concerns the manner in which persons address
and reveal themselves to one another. Speech can take the form of
written or spoken words or even of conduct; each is equally speech
as long as it reveals the being of the person. According to the
court, however, begging, being more conduct than speech, does not
have sufficient communicative content to warrant first amendment
protection, in that it does not send any particular social or political
message; it communicates only the message to collect money.250 To
the contrary, begging discloses to others an important revelation
about the beggar: she needs help because of hunger, the cold, sickness, or mental illness. This is precisely the message that the plaintiffs Young and Walley seek to communicate through begging.
Their affidavits clearly indicate that they do not intend to send a
I'l Young, 903 F.2d at 158.
240 Id. at 153.
247 Id. at 160.
248 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
Id. at 295.
210 Young, 903 F.2d at 154.
24
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message of intimidation, despite the Second Circuit's assertion
that begging is divested of any possible expressive message because
of the subway's "special surrounding circumstances." 25' The plaintiffs' affidavits also demonstrate that begging can
create the readiness for relationships with others. The plaintiffs
Young and Walley stated that begging and panhandling sometimes
occasion questions from, and conversations with, passengers about
the particular problems of the plaintiffs as well as the general
problems of poverty and homelessness. Indeed, some passers-by
even evidence their disagreement with the message of beggars, saying, for example, that the beggar should find a job. This is precisely the living speech which Buber encouraged. In contrast, the
Second Circuit stated that "the First Amendment protects speech
and not every act that may conceivably occasion engagement in
conversation."2 52
The living speech communicated by begging also helps to begin the building of a common logos through which the problems of
poverty and homelessness can be addressed. Communal speaking is
built because through begging, the beggar
show[s] the other something in the world in such a way that from
then on he began really to perceive it; wherever one gave another
a sign in such a way that he could recognize the designated situation as he had not been able to before; wherever one communicated to the other his own experience in such a way that it penetrated the other's circle of experience and supplemented it as
from within, so that from now on his perceptions were set within
a world as they had not been before.253
This, rather than "exact[ing] money from those they accost," is
what is "common to all" acts of begging. Through "[a]ll this flowing ever again into a great stream of reciprocal sharing of knowledge-thus came to be and thus is the living We, the genuine
We.

2 54

The common logos demands a response: responsibility. The
Second Circuit does not want to hear what the destitute can reveal
to us through begging, as it does not want to be responsible for
"solving all the problems" of poverty. It does not want to be influ25 Id. "In the subway, it is the conduct of begging and panhandling ...

gers experience as threatening [and] harassing." Id.
252

25
254

Id.

What is Common to All, supra note 89, at 106.
Id.

that passen-

1991]

BUBERIAN ANALYSIS

enced by the "thou-saying spirit." Moreover, the court's decision
enables each of us to turn a deaf ear to the call as well.
Speech is the great characteristic of human life. If solicitation
of charity by an organization is speech, so too must be the solicitation of charity by individual human beings. There is no better evidence of the cosmic and social homelessness of our era than extending constitutional protection to organizations soliciting charity
for needy persons but not to the needy human beings themselves.
CONCLUSION

Constitutional analysis, especially in the area of individual
rights, needs to incorporate a dialogical orientation to assure that
judicial decisions are truly just to all individuals, regardless of
their economic status in life. If it had adopted such an orientation,
the Second Circuit never would have arrived at its decision in
Young.
Perhaps the error of the Second Circuit's decision can best be
understood by considering a parable recounted by Buber:
When Levi Yitzhak became rav in Berditchev, he made an agreement with the leaders of the congregation that they were not to
ask him to their meetings unless they intended to discuss the introduction of a new usage or a new procedure. One day they
asked him to come to a meeting. Immediately after greeting them,
he asked: "What is the new procedure you wish to establish?"
They answered: "From now on we do not want the poor to
beg at the threshold. We want to put up a box, and all the wellto-do people are to put money into it, each according to his
means, and these funds shall be used to provide for the needy."
When the rabbi heard this, he said: "My brothers, did I not
beg you not to call me away from my studies and summon me to
a meeting for the sake of an old usage or an old procedure?"
The leaders were astonished and protested: "But master, the
procedure under discussion today is new!"
"You are mistaken," he cried. "It is age-old! It is an old, old
procedure that dates back to Sodom and Gomorrah. Do you remember what is told about the girl from Sodom, who gave a beggar a piece of bread? How they took her and stripped her and
smeared her naked body with honey, and exposed her for bees to
devour, because of the great crime she had committed! Who
knows-perhaps they too had a community box into which the
well-to-do dropped their alms in order not to be forced to face
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their poor brothers eye to eye." 215
Constitutional analysis has much to learn, indeed, from Martin Buber's life of dialogue.

25

1947).

M.

BUBER, TALES OF THE HASIDIM: THE EARLY MASTERS

225-26 (0. Marx trans.

